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Laws Against Laws: the Athenian Ideology of Legislation 
Mirko Canevaro (The University of Edinburgh) 
 
 
Introduction 
A seminal moment of the heated debate on the reconstruction of Athenian 
fourth-century nomothesia was the publication in 1975 of MacDowell’s 'Law-Making 
at Athens in the Fourth Century B.C.'.1 MacDowell analysed systematically all the 
extant evidence and proposed an articulation of fourth-century nomothesia in separate 
procedures all in turn supplemented at various points throughout the fourth century. 
His conclusions have not ultimately withstood scrutiny, but his focus on 
reconstructing precisely the relevant procedures and institutions has been upheld in 
later studies by Hansen, Rhodes, Piérart and myself.2 Among MacDowell’s 
contentions, one that was immediately, and rightly, criticized by Hansen and Rhodes 
is that the statements at Dem. 20.91-2 describe a New Legislation Law that replaced 
an Old one: Demosthenes states that as long as the Athenians observed the original 
Solonian laws on nomothesia they did not enact new laws, but when powerful 
politicians made it possible for themselves to pass laws whenever and however they 
wanted, contradictions started arising among the laws, and laws no longer differed 
from decrees, and often were more recent than the decrees.3 Diodorus at Dem. 24.142 
makes similar remarks and complains that rhetores legislate almost every month, 
repeal the laws of Solon and replace them with their own.  
Both Hansen and Rhodes pointed out that these passages, rather than describing 
a specific law, blame malpractices and procedural infractions that are allegedly 
current when politicians without scruples enact new legislation. In Rhodes’ words, 
‘Lept. and Tim. are only two years apart, and the irregularities which Demosthenes 
alleges in them are very similar’. Both Leptines and Timocrates ‘failed to comply 
with a παλαίος νόμος which requires action at a specified time, advance publicity 
for the new proposal, concurrent repeal of any law with which the new proposal 
conflicts’.4 Moreover, these claims are exaggerated and largely unjustified: 
Demosthenes claims that with the old law on legislation the Athenians did not enact 
new laws, yet we have epigraphical evidence of laws enacted before 355.5 He claims 
that clever politicians enact laws whenever and however they want, yet Leptines’ law 
had in fact been enacted by the nomothetai according to the παλαιός νόμος, as 
Demosthenes admits at 20.94, and Leptines’ law was repealed at the trial, which is 
evidence that if the appropriate procedure was not followed, the infractions were later 
                                                
1 MacDowell 1975. Before MacDowell, particularly influential works were Schöll 
1886, Kahrstedt 1938, Atkinson 1939. 
2 Hansen 1979-80; 1985; Rhodes 1985; 2003; Piérart 2000; Canevaro 2013b; 2015; 
2016. 
3 MacDowell 1975: 65, 73 and passim; cf. also MacDowell 2009: 156-66. Contra 
Hansen 1979-80: 88-95, Rhodes 1984: 56, Canevaro 2013b: 241. 
4 Rhodes 1985: 56. See also Hansen 1979-80: 88-95. 
5 Fourth-century laws in chronological order are SEG 26.72; Stroud (1998); Agora 
Excavations, inv. no. I 7495 (unpublished); IG II2 140; IG II2 244; IG II3 320; IG II3 
447; IG II3 445. Cf. also Clinton (2005–8) no. 138; (2008) 116; SEG 52.104. The first 
five are earlier than these speeches. The document at Dem. 24.63 preserves a law 
earlier than these speeches, and should be reliable, cf. Canevaro 2013a: 151-7. 
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sanctioned in court.6 As for the charges that nomoi are indistinguishable from 
psephismata, and that the Athenians legislated too much, Hansen has convincingly 
shown that the distinction (procedural and substantive) between laws and decrees was 
upheld all the way down to 322, and the evidence shows that decrees were much 
more frequently enacted than laws.7 
If the statements at Dem. 20.91-2 and 24.142 are not descriptions of actual 
institutional arrangements, they must be read as rhetorical statements about current 
illegal practices, statements to which the orator expected the audience to respond 
sympathetically, because they reflected shared attitudes to the law, inscribed into an 
ideology of legislation that could be successfully exploited in court. This line of 
enquiry has been less popular among scholars than strictly institutional and legal 
reconstructions, but a few works have attempted to tackle it: Hansen’s, Thomas’ and 
Wohl’s discussions have isolated important features of fourth-century discourse on 
legislation, and highlighted the reliance on the figure of the lawgiver, Solon, in order 
to confer authority to the laws on the basis of their antiquity. They have also argued 
that, even in the fourth century, in order to be acceptable, innovations in the laws had 
to be described as a return to the πάτριοι νόμοι.8 These features seem to be evidence 
of a conservative ideology of legislation, which relies on the antiquity of the laws and 
on the authority of Solon the lawgiver as the foundations of the legal system,9 which 
is ideally characterized by absolute fixity and permanence, and refuses, and is 
threatened by, any change. Such an ideology of legislation seems to be in complete 
opposition to any recognition of popular sovereignty, and Thomas has gone so far as 
to describe it as ‘non-democratic’ and ‘somewhat Spartan’.10 
Of course, if we accept such a description of the fourth-century ideology of 
legislation, we need also to accept that the discourse of legislation was fundamentally 
divorced from, and antithetical to, the procedures and institutions for enacting new 
laws and changing the existing ones. I have reconstructed the relevant procedures 
elsewhere,11 and here is not the place the rehearse my arguments. It will suffice to say 
that the evidence shows clearly that these procedures were aimed at safeguarding the 
coherence of the laws, and their place as separate from matters of day-to-day 
administration. Laws were marked as higher rules that must be scrutinized more 
carefully and extensively, and enacted in a different and more complex manner. At 
the same time, the fourth-century procedures of nomothesia are very clear and 
effective rules of change that formally allow the demos to introduce new laws and 
change the existing ones, and provide a venue for it, relying on democratic 
institutions like the popular lawcourts to secure their implementation. Moreover, they 
show a concern with publicity and accountability that is very democratic in tone.12 
This is very inconsistent with the discourse of legislation as it has been 
reconstructed in recent studies,13 with its concern with the immutability and 
permanence of the laws and its apparent mistrust for popular sovereignty. Yet such a 
                                                
6 Cf. Harris 2008: 20-1 and Kremmydas 2012: 58-69. 
7 Cf. Hansen 1978, 1979 (pace e.g. Banfi 2011: 59-69, who takes instead 
Demosthenes’ criticisms at face value). 
8 Hansen 1989; Thomas 1994; Wohl 2010: 287-301. Cf. Johnstone 1999: 25-33. 
9 Cf. Giannadaki, pp. 000-00. 
10 Thomas 1994: 124, 128-31, 32.  
11 Canevaro 2013b. 
12 See in particular Canevaro 2015 and Canevaro 2013a: 158-60 Cf. Sickinger 2008. 
13 See the references at n. 8. 
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discrepancy is difficult to account for, and we would expect it to hamper the 
workings of legislation, to make laws liable to accusations of illegitimacy, and to 
give rise to widespread mistrust for their provisions. We would expect legislative 
institutions that contradict so radically the shared ideology of legislation to be 
ultimately unworkable, and to undergo significant changes throughout the fourth 
century. Yet this is not the case. Hansen has shown that in the fourth century the 
procedural and substantive distinctions between nomoi and psephismata were 
carefully respected, and general permanent rules were invariably enacted by the 
nomothetai as laws.14 He has also shown that laws preserved on stone are 
significantly fewer than decrees (we have now ten laws, published or unpublished, 
and over 800 decrees from the fourth century15). On the other hand, these laws on 
stone, and several more attested in the literary record, show that legal change 
happened, and new legislation was regularly enacted. Dem. 24.142, a passage in 
which Diodorus accuses the Athenians of legislating too much, states that the 
Athenians summoned nomothetai almost once a prytany, that is, almost ten times a 
year. If we halve this figure to allow for rhetorical exaggeration, we are still left with 
5 sessions of nomothetai a year, each probably dealing with several bills. Yet despite 
the regular enactment of new legislation, the orators invariably show great respect for 
the laws, and often state that the laws are the foundation of anything good happening 
to the city (e.g. Lyc. 1.4, Dem. 25.20-4; Dem. 24.5). We never find any argument 
which resembles Aristotle’s suggestion at Rhet. 1.15.1375a5 that, when the law does 
not support one’s case, one should oppose the law of nature to the laws of the city 
and criticize them because they change too often.16 The laws of Athens,  within the 
boundaries of legal discourse and public life, command universal respect throughout 
the fourth century, and legal change has no negative effect on their authority. 
Moreover, no serious dysfunction in the procedure of nomothesia emerges from the 
epigraphical record – the procedures worked steadily for around eighty years, 
securing the distinction between nomoi and psephismata, and were repealed only in 
322 with the Macedonian domination. The only change appears to be the institution 
at some point in the fourth century of special commissioners (Dem. 20.91) elected to 
inspect the existing laws and find contradictions.17 This addition, rather than 
witnessing the instability of the system, shows that the only reform deemed necessary 
was one whose purpose was to reinforce the checks against inconsistent laws, which 
were already built into the original nomothesia procedure. 
It is then difficult to believe that the discourse about legislation exploited in the 
courts could be so antagonistic to the principles underpinning the actual legislative 
institutions. Recent work in institutional analysis, and in particular what have been 
termed ‘ideational historical institutionalism’ and ‘discursive institutionalism’, has 
stressed the importance of shared and coherent institutional ideologies for the success 
and duration of an institution.18 My purpose in this chapter is to reassess what the 
                                                
14 Hansen 1978, 1979: with the reform of the late-fifth century nomoi were general 
permanent rules enected by the nomothetai, while psephismata were ad hoc decisions 
whose application was limited in time, enacted by the Assembly or the Council (cf. 
Canevaro 2015). 
15 Lambert 2012: 57 n. 31. 
16 Cf. Carey 1996: 36-8; Harris 2006: 162-4. 
17 Aeschin. 3.38-9 attributes the same task to the thesmothetai, see MacDowell 1975: 
72, Rhodes 1985: 60, Hansen 1985: 356. 
18 Cf. e.g. Smith 2006; Lieberman 2002; Schmidt 2008; 2010; 2011. 
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orators (and more specifically Demosthenes) have to say about legal change and its 
consequences, and explain, from an ideological point of view, the stability of the 
legislative procedures throughout the fourth century. The two main texts I will 
employ are Demosthenes’ Against Timocrates and Against Leptines, both speeches 
written for γραφαὶ νόμον μὴ ἐπιτήδειον θεῖναι and whose purpose was to repeal 
laws enacted through nomothesia.  
 
What makes a law bad? Ideological justifications for nomothesia norms 
Diodorus in the Against Timocrates goes systematically about the task of 
demonstrating that the law of Timocrates is not ἐπιτήδειος. This law allowed public 
debtors condemned to the additional penalty of imprisonment until they paid back 
their debts to avoid prison if they could provide sureties. Diodorus claims that it 
enacted with the specific aim of saving Androtion, Glaucetes and Melanopus from 
prison. At §§15-16 Diodorus anticipates two of the main issues he will discuss: when 
the law was passed, and the fact that it was enacted avoiding publicity, almost 
secretively. In the next few paragraphs he goes into more detail about the 
arrangement of his argument against the law, and therefore about its illegalities. He 
announces at §17-18 that he will speak first of the laws that permit γραφαὶ νόμον 
μὴ ἐπιτήδειον θεῖναι, that is about the laws setting the rules for passing new 
legislation, and then he will discuss merits and problems of the law of Timocrates 
itself. In Diodorus’ summary, the law on legislation provides a precise timescale for 
the enactment of new laws, publicity of the bills in front of the monument of the 
Eponymous Heroes, it prescribes that laws should apply to all citizens equally, and 
that any existing laws that contradict it must be first repealed. Diodorus mentions that 
there are also other provisions, but these are the main ones. Timocrates has allegedly 
sinned in all these respects, and therefore Diodorus will have to proceed 
systematically and discuss his infractions one by one. First, Timocrates has not 
respected the correct times to enact legislation, thus his legislation was not enacted 
according to the correct procedures. Second, he has failed to give his proposal 
adequate publicity. The next two infractions are substantive: third, the law of 
Timocrates fails to apply equally to all Athenians, and fourth, it contradicts existing 
laws that Timocrates has failed to repeal.  
At §19 Diodorus announces that he will deal systematically with all these 
aspects. From §20 to 31 the topic is procedure; from §32 to 38 the law forbidding the 
enactment of a new law that contradicts existing ones without repealing them first; 
from §39 to 67, after the speaker has the law of Timocrates read out, we find a series 
of contradictory statutes read and discussed (among these, at §59, Diodorus discusses 
the law about leges ad hominem). Following this long discussion of the grounds on 
which the law of Timocrates is illegal, Demosthenes argues that it is also harmful for 
the city.19 The arrangement of the speech, at least in its first part, follows closely the 
                                                
19 Quass 1971: 27, Rubinstein 2000: 42-3 n. 48 and Kremmydas 2012: 49 all 
correctly show that arguments about illegality and expediency were equally relevant 
to both γραφαὶ νόμων μὴ ἐπιτήδειον θεῖναι and γραφαὶ παρανόμων, regardless 
of the names of the procedures. Contra Wolff 1970: 13-14, 60-4 argues that only 
legal argument were relevant, whereas Hansen 1974: 71-2, 1987: 71-2 believes that 
political arguments were sufficient, without a real need to prove the illegality. 
According to Yunis 1988: 364-70 both lines of argument were essential for winning 
the charge. The evidence of the speeches shows that inconsistency with existing laws 
and with the spirit of the laws was essential, and legal arguments came always first in 
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issues covered by the laws on nomothesia: procedures (that distinguish the enactment 
of laws from that of psephismata), publicity and contradictory statutes. The 
accusation, as should be expected, is grounded on a close reading of the relevant 
laws. The accuser had to quote in the plaint the laws on which he founded his 
prosecution, as well as those that contradicted the law he wanted to repeal.20 Yet 
Diodorus’ legal argument is not drily adherent to the technicalities of the relevant 
laws, but rather full of ideologically charged statements that justify the provisions of 
these laws, and damn the law of Timocrates. These statements draw a nuanced 
picture of an ideology of legal change that is consistent with the relevant Athenian 
institutions and underpins them.  
Diodorus, paraphrases the law on nomothesia at §24  after the secretary reads it 
out,21 and then at §27 has the decree of Epicrates that summons the nomothetai read 
out to show that it infringes upon all the rules just read and discussed.22 The list of 
these infringements at §26 is instructive: proposals for new laws must be published 
before the monument of the Eponymous Heroes for everyone to see and make up 
their mind,23 yet Timocrates has not published his proposal, nor has he allowed the 
Athenians the chance to consider it. Moreover, he did not respect the ‘times’ 
prescribed by the law (τῶν τεταγμένων χρόνων).24 The main issues with the law of 
Timocrates, on the procedural side, are the lack of publicity for the proposal, and the 
failure to enact it following the correct timetable. These are not just technical 
objections. The rationale of the relevant provisions is important and stressed by 
Diodorus. Advance publicity is key because ‘if [one] notices anything against your 
interests, he may point it out and speaks against it at his convenience’ (κἂν 
ἀσύμφορον ὑμῖν κατίδῃ τι, φράσῃ καὶ κατὰ σχολὴν ἀντείπῃ; cf. Dem. 20.94 ἵν᾽ 
ἕκαστος ὑμῶν ἀκούσας πολλάκις καὶ κατὰ σχολὴν σκεψάμενος, ἃν ᾖ καὶ 
δίκαια καὶ συμφέροντα, ταῦτα νομοθετῇ; ‘so that each of you may hear the laws 
many times and have a chance to study them at leisure and enact those that were just 
and in the public interest’). And respecting the prescribed timescale is key to allow 
the people enough time to examine the proposals and if necessary to oppose them. In 
fact, Diodorus (§36-7) lists the advocates of the old laws, the advance publicity of 
proposals, the time before the enactment and the possibility of bringing γραφαὶ 
νόμων μὴ ἐπιτήδειον θεῖναι as the key checks to guarantee that no bad legislation 
(that is, contradicting other laws) is enacted. In the Against Leptines Demosthenes 
stresses repeatedly that he and Phormion abided by the correct procedures, and 
contrasts their behaviour with Leptines’ failure to respect the rules of nomothesia. In 
this case, Demosthenes does not go into detail about Leptines’ infractions, 
presumably because Leptines, unlike Timocrates, had indeed followed the correct 
procedures, as Demosthenes has to admit at §94.25 Demosthenes therefore makes 
                                                                                                                                      
these speeches (see Wolff 1970: 13-14, 60-4). Moreover, the inclusion of the 
inconsistent laws in the plaint was compulsory in γραφαὶ παρανόμων, and 
presumably also in γραφαὶ νόμων μὴ ἐπιτήδειον θεῖναι (see n. 20). 
20 Aeschin. 3.200 with Harris 2013: 121-2. 
21 Canevaro 2013b: 139-50 for Demosthenes’ account of the law. 
22 The document found in the speech which purports to be the decree of Epicrates is 
an unreliable later forgery, see Canevaro 2013a: 104-12. 
23 On the use and significance of the expression ‘for everyone to see’, which usually 
(like in this case) refers to publicity of temporary records, cf. Hedrick 2000: 331-3. 
24 On this timescale see Canevaro 2013b: 146-7. 
25 See Canevaro 2016: 000-00. 
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general arguments about the importance of these procedures, giving the impression 
that Leptines has not followed them without having to provide evidence for it. At §90 
he states: 
 
οὐ γὰρ ᾤετο δεῖν ὁ Σόλων, ὁ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον προστάξας 
νομοθετεῖν, τοὺς μὲν θεσμοθέτας τοὺς ἐπὶ τοὺς νόμους 
κληρουμένους δὶς δοκιμασθέντας ἄρχειν, ἔν τε τῇ βουλῇ καὶ παρ᾽ 
ὑμῖν ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, τοὺς δὲ νόμους αὐτούς, καθ᾽ οὓς καὶ 
τούτοις ἄρχειν καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις πολιτεύεσθαι προσήκει, ἐπὶ 
καιροῦ τεθέντας, ὅπως ἔτυχον, μὴ δοκιμασθέντας κυρίους εἶναι. 
 
Solon, who set up this method of enacting laws, did not think it right for 
the Thesmothetae, who are chosen by lot to administer the laws, to take 
office after two examinations, in the Council and before you in court, but 
for the laws themselves, which these men and all citizens are obliged to 
follow in their public actions, to be passed haphazardly and go into effect 
without having been examined. 
 
To sum up, a law, in order to be good, must be different from a decree, must undergo 
multiple checks, must not be enacted on the spur of the moment and in haste, and in 
order to make sure that this is the case, following the correct procedure is essential. A 
new law is good if it is enacted following scrupulously the procedure of nomothesia, 
while it is doomed to be bad if enacted in defiance of it. 
The other key issue for a new law is its consistency with the existing laws, the 
topic of the whole section Dem. 24.32-67. Diodorus states that in addition to not 
respecting the set times and not giving advance publicity to his proposal, Timocrates 
committed another crime: to introduce his law in violation of all the existing laws. At 
§33 the relevant law, prescribing that one must repeal all contradictory laws before 
enacting a new one and threatening a γραφὴ νόμον μὴ ἐπιτήδειον θεῖναι if one 
fails to do so, is read out, and afterwards Diodorus explains in detail the rationale and 
the qualities of these provisions (§34-5): because the judges have sworn to vote in 
accordance with the laws, if there existed contradictory laws, favouring both litigants, 
that are equally valid, it would be impossible for them to honour their oath. A similar 
rationale is given at Dem. 20.93, where Demosthenes states that ‘contradictory laws 
are repealed so that there is one law on each matter, so that private individuals, who 
would be at a disadvantage in comparison to people who are familiar with all the 
laws, do not get confused, but points of law are the same for all to read as well as 
simple and clear to understand’ (λύοντα τοὺς ἐναντίους, ἵν᾽ εἷς ᾖ περὶ τῶν ὄντων 
ἑκάστου νόμος, καὶ μὴ τοὺς ἰδιώτας αὐτὸ τοῦτο ταράττῃ καὶ ποιῇ τῶν 
ἅπαντας εἰδότων τοὺς νόμους ἔλαττον ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ πᾶσιν ᾖ ταὔτ᾽ ἀναγνῶναι 
καὶ μαθεῖν ἁπλᾶ καὶ σαφῆ τὰ δίκαια). Such a rationale is not just generically 
flagged up in trials concerning the enactment of new laws. The coherence of the legal 
system and consistency of the laws is affirmed and rhetorically exploited elsewhere, 
and informs the interpretation and presentation of statutes relevant to various cases.26 
                                                
26 E.g. Aeschin. 3.37–40 argues that, because there are procedures in place to ensure 
that inconsistent laws are spotted and blocked, it is impossible for two contradictory 
laws about the awarding of crowns to be valid at the same time, and therefore one 
law quoted by Demosthenes in support of his case must be irrelevant to the present 
case. See Sickinger 2008 on the practice of eliminating disagreements among 
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At Dem. 24.39 Diodorus has the law of Timocrates read out, and then discusses 
a series of seven laws that allegedly contradict it yet have not been repealed by 
Timocrates.27 The section is interspersed with statements about how inconsistent 
Timocrates’ law is with these statutes: ‘Consider then how much the law that this man 
enacted is contrary to this law’ (§44, τούτῳ μέντοι τῷ νόμῳ σκέψασθ᾽ ὡς ἐναντίος 
ἐστὶν ὃν οὗτος τέθηκεν), ‘Timocrates immediately begins his law by contradicting 
this rule’ (§55, Τιμοκράτης τοίνυν […] εὐθὺς ἀρχόμενος τοῦ νόμου τἀναντί᾽ 
ἔθηκε τούτοις), ‘Anyone could cite many excellent laws, all of which the law 
enacted by this man contradicts’ (§61, πολλοὺς δ᾽ ἄν τις ἔχοι νόμους ἔτι καὶ 
καλῶς ἔχοντας δεικνύναι, οἷς πᾶσιν ἐναντίος ἐστὶν ὃν οὗτος τέθηκεν). Some of 
the laws presented by Demosthenes as contradictory in fact are not, and the arguments 
of Diodorus are clearly unacceptable. To give only one example, the law at §50 
forbids convicted wrongdoers to make any supplication in the Council or the 
Assembly, and anyone else to make supplications on their behalf. Diodorus explains 
the alleged intent of the lawgiver: as the Athenians are too gentle and would be moved 
by the misfortunes of convicted wrongdoers to accept their supplications and cancel 
their debts, the lawgiver passed a law that forbade such supplications. As begging, 
that is, making a supplication, is better than giving orders, and enacting a law equates 
to giving orders, then a fortiori Timocrates has ordered through his law to save 
Androtion, a convicted wrongdoer, when the law would not even allow begging on his 
behalf. The argument is specious, because the law is concerned specifically with 
supplications, not with enacting new laws.28 On the other hand, some of the other laws 
discussed do contradict Timocrates’: at §63 Diodorus quotes another law of 
Timocrates that prescribes that if someone, following an eisangelia, is convicted to 
pay a fine, he must stay in prison until the fine is paid. The law of Timocrates indicted 
by Diodorus allows instead anyone to escape prison if he offers sureties for his debt. 
These laws are not only contradictory, but they have both been enacted by 
Timocrates, who has therefore contradicted himself.29 
It is interesting however that Demosthenes/Diodorus should choose to mention a 
series of statutes as contradictory, despite the fact that many of his arguments can be 
proved wrong, while he could have as easily stuck to one or two that are actually 
inconsistent, and this would have sufficed to prove that Timocrates had failed to 
repeal the contradictory laws. The reason for such a list is that the orators understand 
the importance of the coherence of the laws on two levels: one level is that of actual 
contradictory provisions with specific statutes, the other, that of consistency with the 
overall aims and spirit of the laws, that is with the legal system as a whole. Because of 
this, proving that the indicted law contradicts specific provisions of other laws is as 
important as proving that it contradicts and virtually invalidates all the laws of the 
city, and their spirit and overall aim. Demosthenes, in his two speeches against laws,  
makes such claims very often. At Dem. 24.1 Diodorus states that Timocrates has 
enacted a law παρὰ πάντας τοὺς νόμους. At §5 that the judges have to decide 
‘whether all the other laws that you have enacted against men who harm the state are 
                                                                                                                                      
statutes, e.g. destroying contradictory inscriptions (pace Lanni 2006: 115-48), and 
Harris 2013: 246-73 on the use of precedents to inform consistent interpretation of 
statutes. Johnstone 1999: 28-9 and Wohl 2010: 287-92 also stress that fourth-century 
Athenians saw their laws as a coherent and rational whole. 
27 Cf. on this section of the speech Canevaro 2013a: 113-56. 
28 Canevaro 2013a: 133-5. 
29 Canevaro 2013a: 152. 
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to be repealed while this one is to remain valid, or this one is to be repealed while the 
others are to remain valid’ (πότερον δεῖ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους νόμους, οὓς ἐπὶ τοῖς 
ἀδικοῦσι τὴν πόλιν ὑμεῖς ἀνεγράψατε, ἀκύρους εἶναι, τόνδε δὲ κύριον, ἢ 
τοὐναντίον τοῦτον μὲν λῦσαι, κατὰ χώραν δὲ μένειν τοὺς ἄλλους ἐᾶν). At §38, 
just before the law of Timocrates is read out and contrasted with seven contradictory 
statutes, Diodorus states: ‘[Timocrates] has introduced a law that contradicts, one 
might say, all those now valid. He did not read out anything, repeal anything…’ 
(νόμον εἰσήνεγκεν ἅπασιν ἐναντίον, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, τοῖς οὖσιν, οὐ 
παραναγνούς, οὐ λύσας…). At §61 he reiterates that ‘Anyone could cite many 
excellent laws, all of which the law enacted by this man contradicts’ […] it will be 
liable to the charge even if it contradicts just one of the existing laws’ (§61, πολλοὺς 
δ᾽ ἄν τις ἔχοι νόμους ἔτι καὶ καλῶς ἔχοντας δεικνύναι, οἷς πᾶσιν ἐναντίος ἐστὶν 
ὃν οὗτος τέθηκεν […] ὑμῖν δ᾽ ὁμοίως ἔνοχος φανεῖται τῇ γραφῇ, καὶ εἰ ἑνὶ τῶν 
ὄντων νόμων ἐναντίος ἐστίν). Demosthenes is aware that some of his examples are 
weak, and stresses that one single contradictory statute would be enough, but the 
impression he is seeking to give is clear: the whole legal system is at odds with 
Timocrates’ law. At §66 Diodorus summarizes this point: ‘I think it is clear to all of 
you that he has enacted his law in violation both of these laws and of those discussed 
earlier, in fact, I could almost say in violation of all the laws of the city’ (ὅτι μὲν 
τοίνυν καὶ παρὰ τούτους τοὺς νόμους καὶ παρὰ τοὺς προειρημένους, καὶ 
μικροῦ δέω παρὰ πάντας εἰπεῖν τοὺς ὄντας ἐν τῇ πόλει, τέθηκε τὸν νόμον, 
οἶμαι δῆλον ἅπασιν ὑμῖν εἶναι).30 
As a bad law is one that contradicts all the laws, it can destroy the city and its 
entire legal system. This is why Diodorus, later in the speech, after all the 
contradictions have been pointed out, can ask the judges whether the law of 
Timocrates is in fact a law or ἀνομία, that is the absence of laws (§152).31 He states 
that ‘the law subverts the entire politeia, destroys political activity and deprives the 
city of many incentives for philotimia’ (§91, ὅλην συγχεῖ τὴν πολιτείαν καὶ 
καταλύει πάντα τὰ πράγμαθ᾽ ὁ νόμος, καὶ πολλὰς φιλοτιμίας περιαιρεῖται τῆς 
πόλεως). Diodorus goes so far as to represent at §§155-6 the very enactment of the 
law of Timocrates as a ruse to destroy all the existing laws. He attributes a similar 
argument to Solon himself, in an anachronistic re-enactment of a γραφὴ νόμον μὴ 
ἐπιτήδειον θεῖναι brought by the ancient lawgiver (§213-14, cf. also Dem. 20.167): 
 
δεῖν δὴ τοὺς δικαστὰς πολλῷ μᾶλλον, εἴ τις ὃ τῆς πόλεώς ἐστι 
νόμισμα, τοῦτο διαφθείρει καὶ παράσημον εἰσφέρει, μισεῖν καὶ 
                                                
30 These passages show very clearly (pace Lanni 2009) that the γραφὴ νόμων μὴ 
ἐπιτήδειον θεῖναι is not exclusively or primarily concerned with securing the 
correctness of democratic procedure. The implication is rather that a bad law 
substantively contradicts the spirit of the laws of the city (and has been enacted only 
thanks to procedural infractions), and this must be shown by pointing to 
contradictions with individual statutes. The correctness of democratic procedure is 
only one of the aspects protected through safeguarding the integrity of the laws of the 
city. 
31 Pace Wohl 2010: 292-301, who reads the reference to anomia as a hidden 
admission that the nomothesia procedure is intrinsically unstable and that any change 
to the laws can endanger the unity and coherence of the laws. It is only the 
introduction of a bad law, without following the correct procedures, that endangers 
the system, cf. Canevaro 2012: 442-3. 
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κολάζειν, ἢ εἴ τις ἐκεῖν᾽ ὃ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν ἐστιν. προσθεῖναι δὲ 
τεκμήριον τοῦ καὶ μεῖζον εἶναι τἀδίκημα, τὸ τοὺς νόμους 
διαφθείρειν ἢ τὸ ἀργύριον, ὅτι ἀργυρίῳ μὲν πολλαὶ τῶν πόλεων καὶ 
φανερῶς πρὸς χαλκὸν καὶ μόλυβδον κεκραμένῳ χρώμεναι 
σῴζονται καὶ οὐδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν παρὰ τοῦτο πάσχουσιν, νόμοις δὲ 
πονηροῖς χρώμενοι καὶ διαφθείρεσθαι τοὺς ὄντας ἐῶντες οὐδένες 
πώποτ᾽ ἐσώθησαν. 
 
Thus if someone debases the currency of the city and introduces a 
counterfeit coin, the judges ought to despise and punish him much more 
than if someone debased the currency of private citizens. He added, to 
prove that corrupting the laws is a worse crime than counterfeiting money, 
that although many cities clearly using coins mixed with bronze and lead 
have survived and suffered no harm at all, none of those that use bad laws 
and allow the destruction of existing laws has ever survived.  
 
But stressing that a new law contradicts the existing laws is not the only method to 
prove that a law is inconsistent with the laws of the city. An orator can as effectively 
argue that it contradicts the spirit and the aims of the existing laws.32 Such arguments 
rely on an understanding of the laws as a coherent whole, predicated both, as we 
have seen, on the existence of procedures to avoid contradictions, and on the 
unifying figure of the lawgiver. The lawgiver is often identified with Solon, but his 
identity sometimes fades, much as it does in modern codes and legal interpretation, 
into an abstract figure which guarantees the coherence of the system.33 This strategy 
is only sparsely used in the Against Timocrates, at the end of which  (§211) Diodorus 
points out that Draco’s and Solon’s greatest contribution to the greatness of Athens is 
that they συμφέροντας ἔθηκαν καὶ καλῶς ἔχοντας νόμους. Is it not just therefore 
that the judges should vote serious punishments τοῖς ὑπεναντίως τιθεῖσιν ἐκείνοις? 
And elsewhere, at §§103 and 106, Diodorus laments that Timocrates is a lawgiver 
very much unlike Solon.  
In the Against Leptines this strategy is exploited fully: at §§13-14 Demosthenes 
states that the ethos of every new law must conform to that of the city, and as the 
ethos of a law reflects that of the man who enacts it, the ethos of the man himself 
must be consistent with that of the city. He illustrates at §§11-12 the ethos of the city 
by narrating an episode, and later at §§102-4 by commenting on some of its oldest 
laws, those on wills and on defamation, which he attributes to Solon. This ethos is 
then contrasted at §105-8 with those of the Spartans and of the Thebans, which are 
different and yet consistent within themselves and with their laws and customs. At § 
153 again Demosthenes urges the Athenians not to allow a law that is completely at 
                                                
32 This aspect is key, and Wolff 1970: 45-67 correctly identifies as a distinctive 
cathegory arguments stressing that the law contradicts general principles extrapolated 
from other statutes. Contra Sundahl 2000, 2009: 493-502 notes that this kind of 
argument is rare when the grammateus reads out an actual law. But the actual reading 
of the contradictory statute was necessary when the point was a formal contradiction. 
Contradiction in principles could be discussed on a more general level without the 
law being read out in full. 
33 The importance of the figure of Solon and ‘the lawgiver’ as the foundation of the 
coherence of the laws is stressed by Johnstone 1999: 29. See also Giannadaki, pp. 
000-00. 
 10 
odds with the ethos of the city, and whose author seems to be moved by envy and 
spite, to stay valid. One should also point out that, seen within this framework, the 
frequent appeals to the intent of the lawgiver (e.g. Hyp. Athen. 13-22; Dem. 18.6, 
22.8-11, 25, 30, 36.27, 58.11; Lyc. 1.9; Lys. 31.27; Isae. 2.13), which have been 
extensively studied by other scholars, seem to be less conservative, and have more to 
do with the preservation and argumentative exploitation of the inner consistency of 
the laws of the city.34 The laws of the city are coherent among themselves in their 
provisions and in their spirit and overall aims, as every new legislator has to conform 
to the ethos of the city, which is in turn defined by its laws, most of which were 
originally enacted by Solon. Thus, Solon’s ethos and intentions provide reliable 
guidance in interpreting and enacting laws, as abiding by the correct procedures of 
nomothesia has made sure that that the original ethos is preserved and reproduced 
with every new law. The choice of the adjective used to define bad laws in the formal 
definition of a public charge against a law, ἐπιτήδειος, is of course not casual. 
According to LSJ (s.v. ἐπιτήδειος) the general meaning of this adjective is ‘fit or 
adapted for [something], suitable’. A new law must be fit to be a coherent part of 
laws of the city, it must be suitable, and accord to their spirit and their purpose.35 
 
Is legal innovation legitimate? 
When it comes to legal change and new laws, the Athenians seem to have stuck to an 
ideology that defined good laws as ones that were enacted following the correct 
procedures, that is abiding by the prescribed times and giving proposals advance 
publicity. If these rules were respected, new laws would not be enacted in haste, they 
would be substantively different from decrees, and most importantly they would 
contradict neither particular existing laws nor the overall spirit of the laws. Following 
the correct procedures ensured that the ethos of the new laws (and therefore the ethos 
of the proposer) was consistent with the ethos of the city and of the existing laws. We 
have seen however at the beginning of this chapter that sometimes new laws were met 
with more radical criticism than that described here, and were criticized apparently for 
the very fact that they were new, that they represented legal change. Such statements 
suggest that criticism of new legislation could be more conservative, and predicated 
on the immutability of the laws and on their antiquity. Such a view would make all 
                                                
34 Thomas 1994: 121-8 argues that such references are evidence of the Athenians’ 
reactionary attitudes to legislation, and that they constitute extra-legal arguments (pp. 
130-2; see also Hillgruber 1988: 107-19). On the contrary, as shown by Johnstone 
1999: 25-33, they aim to guide legal interpretations of particular laws on the basis of 
the coherence and rationality of the legal system, predicated on the aims, the ethos of 
the original lawgiver. They provide therefore the orator with the chance to argue for 
non-literal interpretation of laws, or for interpretations based on principles from 
different laws (see Wolff 1970: 45-67). Schreiner 1913: 12-60 argued that they were 
shorthand for the revised code of the last decade of the fifth century, while 
Ruschenbusch 1966 saw them chiefly as references to the laws of the axones. Hansen 
1989: 79-80 has shown that this is usually true only for private law, criminal law and 
more rarely for the administration of justice. He also argues (pp. 80-82) that the 
audience was meant to believe in the Solonian origin of these laws, but see below pp. 
000-00. 
35 See also Kremmydas 2012 58-61, Wohl 2010: 293 n. 17. 
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new legislation fundamentally illegitimate.36 In the last part of this chapter I will 
therefore try to qualify the statements of Dem. 20.91-2 and 24.142 in the light of the 
principles I have identified, and finally to highlight significantly different approaches 
to legal change found in the orators, to show that nothing in the fourth-century 
Athenian ideology of legislation was fundamentally undemocratic, and the principles 
it fostered were not antagonistic to those embodied in the nomothesia procedure. 
Dem. 20.91-2 and 24.142 at first sight seem to be unequivocally conservative 
and critical of legal change per se. Demosthenes at 20.90 discusses the ‘old law’ about 
legislation, enacted by Solon, which set multiple checks for new laws and made sure 
that to enact a law one had first to repeal contradictory ones. These checks were put in 
place so that laws could not be ‘passed haphazardly and go into effect without having 
been examined’. This ‘old law’ is actually the fourth-century law on nomothesia, 
which is attributed to Solon as many other recent laws are in the orators.37 At §§91-2 
Demosthenes goes on to claim that τέως τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ἐνομοθέτουν, they 
kept to the existing laws and did not enact others. Demosthenes seems to be 
unequivocally referring longingly to a time when people followed the correct rules of 
change and, ironically, as a result did not change the laws at all. But is this what he is 
actually aiming for? If we keep reading the picture becomes more complicated, yet at 
the same time more familiar after the previous analysis: at some point powerful 
politicians conspired to make possible for themselves to pass laws ὅταν τις βούληται 
καὶ ὃν ἂν τύχῃ τρόπον. As soon as Demosthenes stops painting, as a counterpoint 
for a present in which bad laws are enacted, a fabulous past in which, allegedly, laws 
were never changed, the problems with the laws passed by the powerful politicians 
become recognizable. They do not follow the set times and the correct procedures. 
And what is the result of this? Again, Demosthenes’ answer is familiar: ‘the number 
of laws that contradicted each other became so large that you have been for a long 
time appointing men to correct the contradictions’ (τοσοῦτοι μὲν οἱ ἐναντίοι σφίσιν 
αὑτοῖς εἰσὶ νόμοι, ὥστε χειροτονεῖθ᾽ ὑμεῖς τοὺς διαλέξοντας τοὺς ἐναντίους ἐπὶ 
πάμπολυν ἤδη χρόνον). And moreover ‘the laws do not differ at all from decrees’ 
(§92, ψηφισμάτων δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν διαφέρουσιν οἱ νόμοι). So, despite the 
exaggerated picture of a past completely antithetical to the present, what Demosthenes 
is accusing present politicians of doing is not of passing laws at all, but of passing 
them without following the correct times and procedures, with the result that they 
enact contradictory laws that do not respect the key requirement of being general 
permanent rules, and that therefore resemble decrees. Demosthenes paints an extreme 
counterpoint to current practices in order to stress how negative current practices are, 
not to propose that the Athenians should not legislate at all. 
At Dem. 24.139-42 we find a similar argument. Diodorus recalls the laws of the 
Locrians, which allow a citizen to propose a new law only with a noose around his 
neck. If the law is accepted, the proposer walks away, but if not, the noose is drawn 
tight.38 As a result, Diodorus says, ‘they do not dare to pass new laws, but strictly 
adhere to the long established laws’ (καὶ γάρ τοι καινοὺς μὲν οὐ τολμῶσι 
τίθεσθαι, τοῖς δὲ πάλαι κειμένοις ἀκριβῶς χρῶνται). Only once a citizen dared to 
pass a law, confident that his case was so fair that he could not lose. Again, this 
                                                
36 This view is expressed most prominently by Thomas 1994, particularly pp. 128-30; 
see also Wohl 2012: 292-301. The passages discussed below are taken at face value 
also by Kahrstedt 1938: 12-18; Harrison 1955: 26-35; Ehrenberg 1960: 57. 
37 See Hansen 1979-80: 88-95, Rhodes 1984: 56, Canevaro 2013b: 241. 
38 Polyb. 12.16 attributes this law to Zaleucus. 
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statement seems to suggest that a desirable situation is one in which no new laws are 
ever passed, yet once again this example is a polemical counterpoint to current 
practices by bad legislators, rather than a positive proposition of how the city should 
administer itself. First of all, the example given comes from outside Athens, and 
Demosthenes himself (20.105-11), explains that the customs and laws of other cities 
can be good, but are suited to the characters and constitutions of the other cities, and 
cannot be uncritically transferred elsewhere. It is interesting to reconstruct what the 
argument of Leptines might have been in that context: according to Demosthenes’ 
account, he argued that in other well-administered cities like Sparta nobody is ever 
granted honours, whereas in Athens the honours are excessive and sometimes 
individuals who do not deserve it are beneficiaries of ateleia. The extreme case of 
poleis where no honours are allowed is used to make the point not that Athens should 
grant no honours, but only that it should cancel ateleia. Extreme examples are used to 
show that practices completely opposite to the Athenian ones are possible and 
successfully followed elsewhere (in time or space), but their actual purpose is hardly 
ever to suggest that the Athenians should adopt the same extreme practices described. 
The actual aim of an orator is usually more modest: to cancel one honour, or, in the 
Against Timocrates, to enact laws more carefully and follow the correct procedures. 
After the Locrian example, in fact, Diodorus goes on to describe the Athenian 
situation, and unsurprisingly the fault, once again, of the Athenian rhetores is not 
simply that ὅσοι μῆνες μικροῦ δέουσι νομοθετεῖν, but that they enact τὰ αὑτοῖς 
συμφέροντα. They legislate too much, but this is an issue because of the kind of laws 
they enact, which are not meant to benefit the polis and apply to all Athenians alike, 
but rather to benefit themselves. And as they enact these bad laws for their own profit, 
they repeal Solon’s laws. Yet once again the phrasing is not that simple: the passage 
does not say that repealing the laws of Solon οὓς οἱ πρόγονοι ἔθεντο is unacceptable 
without qualification. First, the passage makes clear that the problem is repealing the 
laws of Solon to replace them with bad laws drafted for the benefit of dishonest 
rhetores. And second, the laws of Solon are not simply good, they are good because 
πάλαι δεδοκιμασμένους. The perfect with the adverb πάλαι stresses that their 
antiquity guarantees their worth because they have been repeatedly tested and have 
proved their expediency. In Dem. 20 and 24 the references to the antiquity of a law 
have often this pragmatic justification of their authority: at Dem. 24.24 Diodorus 
praises the laws about nomothesia because they have been in force for a long time, so 
they have often proven that they are beneficial to the Athenians, and no one would 
want to criticize them; at Dem. 24.34 the law about repealing contradictory laws 
before enacting a new one is excellent not simply because it is old, but because it is 
just and defends the people’s interests. And at Dem. 20.118 Demosthenes goes as far 
as to state that it is the duty of the judges, sanctioned by their oath, to give judgement 
in accordance with the laws, not those of the Spartans or the Thebans, and not even 
those of their earliest ancestors, but those those that are valid at the time.  
To sum up, even these passages, which have been interpreted as suggesting a 
more extremely conservative view of legislation, one which altogether questions the 
legitimacy of legal change, upon closer reading prove to be more nuanced, and 
certainly not undemocratic. In fact, they show the very same concerns with procedural 
observance, distinction between nomoi and psephismata and coherence of the laws 
that we have observed in the previous section, and that are embodied in the procedure 
of nomothesia. And, moreover, one should keep in mind that these passages are all 
found in speeches delivered for the purpose of repealing a law recently enacted. It is 
not surprising that they should indulge in strong arguments against the enactments of 
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these laws. It is likely that our picture would be significantly different if we could read 
speeches in defence of a new law, or speeches that actually propose its approval to the 
nomothetai. Regrettably, no such speech is extant. Yet a few passages about enacting 
new laws in the Against Leptines, the Against Timocrates and Aeschines’ Against 
Timarchus shed some light on Athenian public discourse about legislation, and 
balance out some of the most conservative statements we have discussed. They 
suggest that enacting laws is a viable and perfectly acceptable option, that there is 
nothing fundamentally wrong with it, as long as the correct procedures are followed 
and the requirements are upheld. 
The Against Timocrates is completely concerned with showing how illegitimate 
the enactment of Timocrates’ law is, yet even in this context a couple of passages 
show that enacting laws is not a problem per se. At §44 Diodorus discusses a law 
which contradicts the law of Timocrates and concludes with the apostrophe: 
‘Timocrates, you should either have not proposed this law or repealed that one, rather 
than, just to suit your wishes, throw everything into confusion just to suit your wishes’ 
(καίτοι χρῆν σ᾽, ὦ Τιμόκρατες, ἢ τοῦτον μὴ γράφειν ἢ ἐκεῖνον λύειν, οὐχ, ἵν᾽ ὃ 
βούλει σὺ γένηται, πάντα τὰ πράγματα συνταράξαι). As long as the laws of city 
are consistent, enacting a new law is a perfectly acceptable option, but doing so 
without repealing the contradictory laws is not. At §29 Diodorus points out that 
Timocrates had the nomothetai summoned with the excuse of the budget and the 
Panathenaea, and the object of his blame is the fact that no law was actually 
introduced about these matters. Once again, legislating is perfectly acceptable, and 
there is nothing wrong in summoning the nomothetai, as long as one legislates on the 
matters about which they are summoned. More interestingly, at §§144-7 Diodorus 
allows us to see how Timocrates may have justified his law, and the argument 
Diodorus foresees he might employ is based on the very same principle that 
underscores many arguments against new laws: Timocrates will justify his law by 
quoting and discussing a law that orders that no Athenian must be sent to prison, and 
φήσειν ἀκόλουθον αὐτῷ τεθηκέναι. The discriminating factor between a good and 
a bad law, whether the speaker is accusing or defending the law, is its coherence with 
the laws in force in the city. 
The Against Leptines is even more instructive about  attitudes towards enacting 
new laws, because it not only argues for repealing the law of Leptines, but also 
advocates the enactment of a replacement law.39 At the very beginning of the speech 
(§4) Demosthenes argues that if one believed that Leptines’ reasons for enacting his 
law (the Athenians are often deceived) were  justified, then it would also be justified 
to deprive the people completely of their sovereignty, as the people are often deceived 
on many matters. The speaker observes that the Athenians would never pass such a 
law, and should rather pass one that punishes those who deceive the people. The 
alternative to enacting a bad law is enacting a good one, not refusing to enact any. 
And at §23 Demosthenes suggests that if Leptines were right and the Athenians really 
had difficulties in finding enough liturgists, they should reform the system and 
administer it through symmoriai, as they do with eisphora and trierarchies. Again, the 
solution to an issue is good legislation, which is evidently an acceptable option. At 
§88 Demosthenes introduces the topic of the replacement law proposed by him and 
Phormion. He is careful to show that the law is fair and does not order anything 
shameful, and then proceeds to show in the next paragraphs that they are proposing it 
                                                
39 See Canevaro 2016 for a reconstruction of the legal case and the procedure. See 
Kremmydas 2012: 45-55 for an overview of previous interpretations. 
 14 
according to the correct procedures, and are contextually repealing the law of Leptines 
that is contradictory. The new law proposed is defended by appealing to the same 
principles used to attack the laws of Leptines and Timocrates. The discourse about 
legislation seems to be consistent with the principles underpinning nomothesia, and 
can be used both against and in favour of a law. At §§100-1 Demosthenes even 
anticipates that Leptines and his supporters will accuse him of using the replacement 
law as a ruse, and having in fact no intention to enact it. Apparently accusing 
somebody of not enacting a new law was in appropriate circumstances a viable 
argumentative strategy, and Demosthenes counters the accusation by urging his 
opponents to enact the law themselves, if they are so keen. 
In fourth-century Athens, procedures and ideas about legislation matched and 
reinforced each other, and ultimately legislation was considered to be the remit of the 
people as much as enacting the decrees in the Assembly or passing judgements in 
court. As Aeschines states very clearly (1.177-8), the Athenians are responsible for 
making the best laws, and their laws are good because of how the Athenians comport 
themselves when enacting them: they take into account the principles of justice and 
the public good and do not enact them for dishonest profit or enmity.  
When the authority of Solon is invoked as the foundation of the laws, this is 
because his legislative action is the blueprint on which all Athenian legislation is (or 
should be) modelled, reproduced by the Athenian people every time new legislation 
is enacted. One of the most interesting pieces of evidence for the Athenian reliance, 
even in the fourth century, on the authority of the lawgiver rather than on popular 
sovereignty, Aeschin. 1.5-37,40 after a long list of ancient laws, significantly ends 
with a new law, consistent in spirit and intent with these, and therefore no less 
authoritative. In this section Aeschines discusses Solonian laws that show how the 
concern for decency is central to the laws of Athens. At the beginning of the section 
Aeschines states ‘My belief is that whenever we enact laws, we should be concerned 
with how to make laws that are good and advantageous for our politeia’ (§6, 
προσήκειν δὲ ἔγωγε νομίζω, ὅταν μὲν νομοθετῶμεν, τοῦθ᾽ ἡμᾶς σκοπεῖν, ὅπως 
καλῶς ἔχοντας καὶ συμφέροντας νόμους τῇ πολιτείᾳ θησόμεθα). Before even 
mentioning Draco and Solon, the author of the laws in Athens is identified as the 
Athenian people, who should enact good and advantageous laws. And finally, after 
discussing a series of ancient laws concerned with decency, Aeschines at §§33-4 
concludes by mentioning a new law, which gives a different tribe the task of 
presiding over the platform at each Assembly meeting and policing decorum. He 
claims that this law was proposed following the observation of Timarchus’ shameless 
behaviour at the bema, and that its provisions, spirit and aims are perfectly consistent 
with those of the laws of Solon discussed in the previous section. This law, according 
to Aeschines, deserves a place next to the ancient laws he has just discussed, despite 
having been indicted through a γραφὴ νόμον μὴ ἐπιτήδειον θεῖναι by Timarchus 
and other speakers of the same sort (it was in fact retained, as we learn from Aeschin. 
3.4).  
This passage, like the others mentioned above, is evidence that there is in 
Athenian public and legal discourse about legislation no prejudice against legal 
change and the enactment of new statutes. Enacting a new law is always a viable 
option, as it is well within the prerogatives of the Athenian people. There are however 
rules. These rules make sure that laws are not passed in haste, without regard for the 
distinction between nomoi and psephismata, and most importantly that they do not 
                                                
40 Cf. the discussion of Thomas 1994: 123. 
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contradict other statutes, and are consistent with the overall aims and ethos of the 
legal system. The ideas about legislation expressed and exploited in the extant 
speeches against inexpedient laws, as well as in other speeches of the orators, are 
hardly evidence of undemocratic attitudes to legislation. They form a complex texture 
of interconnected ideological tenets and argumentative options that manages to 
reinforce and underpin the relevant procedures, recognizing popular sovereignty while 
at the same time grounding the internal rationality and coherence of the legal system 
on the original ethos of the ancient lawgiver, which is perpetuated through abiding by 
the nomothesia procedures. 
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